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Abstract
Background: Earthquakes are renowned as being amongst the most dangerous and destructive types of natural
disasters. Iran, a developing country in Asia, is prone to earthquakes and is ranked as one of the most vulnerable
countries in the world in this respect. The medical response in disasters is accompanied by managerial, logistic,
technical, and medical challenges being also the case in the Bam earthquake in Iran. Our objective was to explore
the medical response to the Bam earthquake with specific emphasis on pre-hospital medical management during
the first days.
Methods: The study was performed in 2008; an interview based qualitative study using content analysis. We
conducted nineteen interviews with experts and managers responsible for responding to the Bam earthquake,
including pre-hospital emergency medical services, the Red Crescent, and Universities of Medical Sciences. The
selection of participants was determined by using a purposeful sampling method. Sample size was given by data
saturation.
Results: The pre-hospital medical service was divided into three categories; triage, emergency medical care and
transportation, each category in turn was identified into facilitators and obstacles. The obstacles identified were
absence of a structured disaster plan, absence of standardized medical teams, and shortage of resources. The army
and skilled medical volunteers were identified as facilitators.
Conclusions: The most compelling, and at the same time amenable obstacle, was the lack of a disaster
management plan. It was evident that implementing a comprehensive plan would not only save lives but decrease
suffering and enable an effective praxis of the available resources at pre-hospital and hospital levels.
Background
Earthquakes are renowned as being amongst the most
dangerous and destructive types of natural disasters
known. More than one million earthquakes occur
worldwide each year. Major earthquakes occur on aver-
age once every three years [1]. On a global scale a total
of 400,000 people have been killed and 46 million
affected by earthquakes and tsunamis, between 1991
and 2005 [2]. Consequently, an effective earthquake
response is paramount in saving lives and limiting long
term effects.
More than 90% of all the deaths caused by natural dis-
asters occur in developing and underdeveloped countries
[3]. Iran, a developing country in Asia, is prone to earth-
quake [4] and ranked as one of the most vulnerable
countries in the world in respect to earthquakes and
more than 180,000 people have died in earthquakes over
the last 90 years [4-6].
An earthquake with a magnitude of 6.7 on the Richter
scale hit the city of Bam in Iran (Figure 1) [7]. The Bam
earthquake is considered to be one of the 21st century’s
major earthquakes [8-10]. Approximately 40 thousand
people perished and nearly 30,000 were injured [11,12].
Health services were rendered as non-functional
(Table 1) [13]. More than 12 thousand injured people
were evacuated, which put enormous demands on the
disaster responding systems and admission sites [7,14].
The medical response in disasters is normally accom-
panied by managerial, logistic, technical, and medical
challenges [15-19] which was also the case in the Bam
earthquake [12,20,21]. Our objective was to explore the
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medical response to the Bam earthquake with specific
emphasis on the pre-hospital medical management dur-
ing the first days.
Our aim was to identify obstacles and facilitators in
pre-hospital medical response focusing on analyzing the
organizational preparedness. We believe that the results
can be used in designing an appropriate disaster man-
agement plan for both pre-hospital and the hospital
services.
Methods
The study was performed in 2008 on an interview based
qualitative study using content analysis [22,23]. We used
content analysis as a research method for the subjective
interpretation of the content of interview data through a
systematic classification process of coding and identify-
ing concepts or patterns.
We conducted nineteen interviews with experts and
managers of Iran’s emergency and disaster medicine sys-
tem. The participants were involved in the medical
response to the Bam earthquake, including pre-hospital
emergency medical services, the Red Crescent, and Uni-
versities of Medical Sciences. They had more than 5-
year experience in disaster medicine and had partici-
pated in previous disasters.
The selection of participants was determined using a
purposeful sampling method. The participants were
included until saturation of each concept was reached
and further data collection failed to contribute additional
information. Sample size was given by data saturation.
Each interview lasted between 50 and 90 minutes. The
interviews were conducted in Persian by the same inter-
viewer, transcribed verbatim and then translated to Eng-
lish. Content analysis was performed on the data written
in Persian, before translation.
The interview guide included a list of general ques-
tions used as a tool for initiating the interviews. Com-
plementary probe questions were added when needed
and, data collection and content analysis identified
ideas, as is in accordance with the methodology.
During the open coding phase, all the interviews were
read several times, and key words and phrases, incidents
and facts in the text were noted. Primary codes were
extracted. The codes and data were compared for simi-
larities and differences.
Categories and sub-categories were developed. From
the first interview, a preliminary set of codes, categories
and sub-categories was created. These codes were
described as the results [22-24]. In accordance with the
methodology of content analysis [23,24]; this was per-
formed by the same investigator for all interviews.
Data validation was performed through in-depth pro-
longed engagement with the data [22-24]. This proce-
dure, combined with the available transcribed data and
notes from the analysis process, are considered to
ensure trustworthiness. Also, the transcriptions and a
summary of primary result (codes and categories)
checked by the participants in order to improve validity
(member check).
Ethical considerations
Ethical clearance of the study was obtained from the
Natural Disaster Research Institute in Iran. Informed
Figure 1 The geographical place of the Bam earthquake .
Source: International Institute of Earthquake Engineering and
Seismology, Iran.
Table 1 Damage of health care infrastructures due to the
Bam earthquake
Health Facility Number % of Damage
Health house 95 100
Rural Health Center (RHC) 14 100
Urban Health Center (UHC) 10 100
Health posts (Urban) 5 100
Maternity facilities (as part of RHC) 5 100
Emam district hospital (public) 136 beds 50
Mahdieh maternity hospital (public) 54 beds 40
Aflatoonyan hospital (private) 65 beds 100
Emergency station (115) 1 100
Behvarz training center 1 100
District health network expansion center 1 100
District health care management center 1 100
Facualty of nursing and paramedics (2000 sq.m.) 100
Dormitory of the faculty of nursing (1500 sq.m.) 100
Source: World Health Organization (Ref: [7])
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consent was obtained and all participants were informed
that they could refuse to participate or withdraw from
the study at any time.
Results
Demographic characteristics for the participants
The mean age of the participants was 43.5; well-edu-
cated in both health and medical sciences (Table 2).
The process of triage, treatment and transportation of
casualties
The pre-hospital medical services were divided into
three categories; triage, treatment (emergency medical
care) and transportation, and for each category in turn
we had identified facilitators and obstacles (Table 3).
Obstacles to Triage
The most important factor which affected the perfor-
mance and workload of the medical services was the
absence of triage. This was observed both at the pre-
hospital and hospital level. The casualties were trans-
ferred to the airport or hospitals in nearby cities without
being triaged. The lack of triage had detrimental conse-
quences for both treatment and transportation, as well
as the workload for the responding emergency medical
services. For instance, a participant said “Triage wasn’t
conducted during the medical response to the earth-
quake. Most of the casualties that were transported to
nearby cities or to the airport only had minor injuries.”
The absence of a structured procedure and organized
teams were the reasons for the lack of triage. In fact,
there was no standardized operational plan for perform-
ing triage at the scene whatsoever. The lack of material
resources was another contributing factor limiting the
execution of triage. This included the lack of markers,
tags, data forms, and basic medical equipment. Conse-
quently, relatives and responders took the casualties
directly to the airport or transferred them to hospitals at
of nearby cities. A manager explained that “With the
lack of a disaster management plan and triage
procedures, as well as incorrect policies, these were the
main reasons that triage was not performed.“
“Triage was missed due to the lack of both triage
teams and resources. There was no organized triage
team on the scene. There was also a complete and
apparent lack of essential triage resources during the
first day.“
Facilitators of Triage
Groups of medical personnel, from the army and medi-
cally trained volunteers from the universities, were trans-
ferred to the earthquake area by the military air force
within a few hours of locating the earthquake. Some of
them were medical doctors, including surgeons and
emergency medicine physicians. The airport was full of
casualties needing medical attention and there was a con-
tinuous flow of earthquake victims being transported
from the city to the airport. The medical personnel
stayed at the airport and initiated medical treatment.
These specialists weren’t planned to be part of the
standardized emergency medical teams, and were not
equipped with the necessary medical equipment or pro-
vided with resources to enable triage. However, they
organized themselves as a response team and used the
available resources and facilities to help the casualties at
the airport as much as possible under the given circum-
stances. “When we arrived in Bam, as individual medi-
cal officers and not part of a specific team, and without
any pre-packed medical resources, we were struck by the
large number of casualties at the airport.” reported by a
medical professional.
Developing a triage system at the airport was the most
important activity providing by this team. The airport
was the only place where the earthquake victims were
triaged, albeit in a limited fashion, without standardiza-
tion or overall coordination and with a delayed start.
They divided the airport waiting rooms into a few sepa-
rate areas. They evaluated most of the casualties before
further transport with airplanes and used the available
resources for marking the casualties as triage groups. In
addition, life saving medical care was administered. “We
organized the personnel as a team with the objective of
conducting triage and giving life saving interventions on
site at the airport. However, due to the shortage of
resources, security and managerial problems, our system
wasn’t effective enough.“ an expert said.
Another participant reported that “The absence of triage
on scene made us perform primary triage at the airport.
Performing triage decreased the overall workload for the
medical service and transport organizations at all levels.“
Obstacles to Treatment
Emergency medical care on scene is life saving. Partici-
pants explain that this critical function was missed at
Table 2 The background of the experts and managers
participating in the current study
Age (years) Mean (range) 43.5 (35-63)
Gender (%) Male 100%
Field of knowledge (n) Medical science 12
Health management 4
Emergency medicine 3
Level of education (n) PhD 4
General Practitioner 7
Master of Science 5
Bachelor of Science 3
n = number
Djalali et al. Scandinavian Journal of Trauma, Resuscitation and Emergency Medicine 2011, 19:30
http://www.sjtrem.com/content/19/1/30
Page 3 of 9
the scene and basically all of the casualties were trans-
ferred to other cities without receiving initial medical
attention. A medical doctor working at the airport said
that “All of the casualties arrived at the airport without
first having medical attention before transportation from
the earthquake site. Only, a few casualties had an intra-
venous line or wound dressings. In fact, the majority of
the casualties received medical attention at the receiving
hospitals.“
However, the absence of a disaster management plan
was the main reason for the lack of treatment. For
instance, a manager said that “We tried to provide on
scene medical care for the casualties before taking them
to the hospitals but it wasn’t possible due to the lack of
plan for how the medical system was supposed to man-
age the large number of casualties in a city structurally
destroyed by the earthquake.“
A disaster management plan along with emergency
medical teams is the most important functions in order
to guarantee appropriate medical care in a disaster area.
During the Bam earthquake, a large number of disaster
medical assistance teams were needed in order to pro-
vide emergency medical care. This need was not met.
An expert explained that “One of the main shortcomings
in Iran’s medical disaster management system, with
respect to the Bam earthquake, was the lack of standar-
dized disaster medical teams.”
Another expert mentioned that “Due to the lack of
structured medical teams, untrained medical volunteers
that were involved in rescuing and caring for casualties.
They were not organized as teams. They were like small
islands and their performance was not good enough.
Actually, we had to support them with medical and gen-
eral equipment.“
The interviewees emphasized the shortage of resources
on the scene. Medical teams did not have enough equip-
ment during the acute phase, and the destruction of all
medical facilities made the situation worse. Conse-
quently, medical services ceased during the first night.
This, along with the cold weather, worsened the medical
condition for the casualties.
A manager said that “We had a considerable shortage
of resources for providing medical services at the earth-
quake area during the first days.”
And another added that “Working at the earthquake
area amongst extensive destruction, a large number of
casualties, with too few medical responders and with a
lack of resources was difficult. As a result, medical ser-
vices stopped during the first night. Besides, it was very
cold and most of victims were exposed and could not
keep warm. Consequently, some of them died due to
exposure.”
Facilitators of Treatment
Experienced and trained medical responders had
enhanced the emergency medical response performance.
Several organizations mobilized with the aim of redu-
cing the impact of the Bam earthquake. Especially the
army and the Red Crescent assisted the EMS. They sent
medical teams to the scene, who participated in the
search for buried victims, and contributed to the trans-
portation of casualties. These teams included trained
medical staff with experience from previous mass
casualties, along with medical supplies. The army and
the Red Crescent also provided logistics support. “Mili-
tary medical teams were one of the first teams that
arrived at the earthquake site. They supported the pre-
hospital medical system in every way, providing medical
services, equipment and personnel.“
“Iran’s Red Crescent sent many ambulances and medi-
cal teams to the earthquake area. They conducted rescue
operations, provided basic medical care for the casual-
ties, and transported them to the airport or nearby cities
as required.“
Many volunteers from the Universities of Medical
Sciences arrived at the earthquake area in addition to the
above mentioned organizations. Some of whom were
well educated and had previous experience of disasters.
Volunteers with advanced medical degrees could, partly,
compensate for a lack of standardized medical teams.
The medical response could have been different had
there been a disaster management plan, an organization
Table 3 Key factors related to the pre-hospital medical services during the medical response to the Bam earthquake
Pre-hospital medical response Obstacles Facilitators
Triage - Absence of triage plan
- Absence of triage teams
- Absence of resources
- Medical specialists at the airport
Treatment - Absence of disaster plan
- Lack of Disaster Medical Assistance Teams
- Shortage of resources
- Trained medical personnel from Army
- Large number of medical volunteers
Transportation - Absence of transportation plan
- Lack of standardized transportation system
- No control on transportation of the casualties
- Airlifting of casualties by Army
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for coordinating the rescue efforts and sufficient
resource. “The presence of medically trained volunteers
helped the medical system to care for thousands of
casualties on scene, despite them not being organized as
standardized teams“ according to one of the interviewee.
Another study participant said that “if the managers
had organized the medical volunteers as coordinated
teams, the medical services could have been conducted
more effectively.”
Other responders were international emergency medi-
cal teams. These teams arrived late, when the earth-
quake site was cleared of trauma victims, hence despite
having structured teams their contribution was
insignificant.
Obstacles to Transportation
The transportation of casualties to medical centres is an
essential function in disaster response. The government
decided to transfer all casualties to other cities since the
Bam earthquake had destroyed all the local medical
facilities. The lack of a disaster plan affected these
operations also. In fact, there was no coordinated trans-
portation plan at any level, neither was there an organi-
zation or a team responsible for the transportation of
victims. At times, casualties were airlifted from the
earthquake area without coordination with the receiving
medical system. A participant mentioned “There was no
operational plan nor were there procedures for transpor-
tation. All decisions were made on the spur of the
moment.“
“Casualties were, in some cases, transferred from the
earthquake area to a specific city, and because of the
inability to admit the casualties, they were referred to
yet a second city“ according to another interviewee.
The lack of a coordinated plan for transportation of
the casualties resulted in traffic chaos and a stop in air
transportation. The roads were not controlled by the
police and became blocked by vehicles. Additionally all
transportation from Bam to the airport and the further
evacuation by air was stopped during the first night
because of darkness, very cold weather and lack of
safety. A participant reported “The roads were comple-
tely congested, to the extent that evacuating the casual-
ties by road way was impossible.“
“Only a few hours after the arrival of the first response
teams, the evacuation by air was stopped“ according to
another participant.
Furthermore, there were no standardized transporta-
tion methods, neither for ground vehicles nor by air.
There were, also, no standard protocols for evacua-
tion, a shortage of transportation vehicles and trained
medical personnel. There was a long delay in initiating
the evacuation which resulted in a disorganised evacua-
tion of the earthquake casualties. This may have
increased the mortality and the long term medical com-
plications, e.g. spinal injury.
“Since the arrival of rescue workers was delayed, some
untrained response workers and laypeople began evacu-
ating the casualties to nearby cities in private vehicles,
without taking medical considerations.“
Another expert said “there weren’t sufficient resources,
equipment or ambulances. As a result, the casualties
were evacuated without medical considerations.”
“Victims transported by air must be done based on
standardized protocols. Unfortunately many casualties
were left on the floor of the airplanes without proper
fixation or a plan for medical care during the flight.” as
mentioned by another interviewee.
Furthermore, the absence of a prioritization for eva-
cuation of the individual casualties was a problem.
There were no rules or plans for the evacuation of
casualties from the city to the airport, and from there
on to the receiving cities. All casualties, both mild and
severe, as well as relatives, were transported to the
receiving cities, without a priority for the severe injured.
This resulted in prolonged waiting times for all casual-
ties involved. “There was no control or security system at
the airport.”
Another participant reported that “medical priority
was often missed while evacuating the casualties. Many
casualties with mild or even without injuries were trans-
ported to other cities, while some casualties with severe
injuries were still waiting for evacuation.”
Facilitators of Transportation
The evacuation of thousands of victims from Bam in
two days was one of largest rescue operations ever per-
formed in the history of Iran. Ground transportation
was the most common means of transporting victims on
the first day and by air on the second. In fact, there
were two evacuation waves. A small number of casual-
ties were evacuated on the first day. The second wave
started in the early morning on the second day and con-
sisted of casualties evacuated mainly by air.
It was the air force’s responsibility, along with the air
transport organization, to provide the evacuation by air.
In addition they carried managers, medical teams and
equipment to the earthquake area.
A participant said “The air force managed to reopen
the airport, which had been damaged by the earthquake,
and more than 10,000 casualties were evacuated within
24 hours through this airport.”
Another participant added that “The air force and air
transport organization concentrated all efforts on estab-
lishing a reliable evacuation path by air from Bam to
the rest of the country.”
This situation was also seen in other cities, especially
in the capital, Tehran. A manager quoted “Several
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thousand casualties had been taken to Tehran’s airport.
The Air force established an air bridge between the air-
port and other large hospitals.”
Discussion
In this article we focused on the pre-hospital issues of the
early response phase to the Bam earthquake. The key ele-
ments in the pre-hospital medical response to disasters are
correct triage, immediate treatment and in giving priorities
for evacuation [25], which our study also addressed.
Obstacles to the pre-hospital medical response could be
summarized as the lack of a comprehensive disaster man-
agement plan, the absence of standardized disaster medical
assistance teams, and a shortage of resources. While the
facilitators were skilled medical volunteers and support
from other organizations especially the army.
Triage
During the medical response to a disaster, triage is
needed at three locations: (1) on scene; (2) in the treat-
ment and resuscitation area; and (3) at the receiving
hospital [8].
The current study emphasized that the triage process
was problematic, not performed on scene but was to a
certain extent at the airport. All previous studies from
the Bam earthquake [11,14,26], with exception of one
[13], support the observation in the absence of triage.
Reports from other earthquakes show divergent results
with respect to triage. During the tsunami in Thailand
in 2004, field triage was performed and 70% of the vic-
tims were primarily treated in the field or triaged to
emergency healthcare centres [27]. Yasin, however,
explains that after the earthquake in Pakistan in 2005,
most of the casualties received at the hospital were
referred directly from the earthquake site without being
triaged [28].
In summary, the lack of triage could affect medical
response at all levels. In other disasters, triage has been
performed to a varying extent. With the current medical
response organization in Iran, hospitals should expect to
receive many non-triaged casualties in the event of an
earthquake. Therefore, some of the resources will be
“unnecessarily” used for low priority cases, instead of
the severely injured casualties. Triage is a vital issue in a
disaster plan.
Treatment
There was a lack of on site emergency medical treat-
ment. This finding was supported by other studies
[10,11,14,21]. Mirhashemi et al. studied 185 casualties of
the Bam earthquake and saw that as much as 72.4-
85.9% of the patients did not receive primary medical
treatment on site [10].
Reports from other earthquakes show a similar situa-
tion worldwide, that medical response was inadequate
on site, and most of the casualties were transported
away from the earthquake area without initial medial
treatment [28-30].
In summary, there was lack of immediate and ade-
quate emergency medical care during the Bam earth-
quake. This could be one of the reasons for the high
death toll in the Bam earthquake. Also, it is to be
expected that the receiving hospitals not only receive
non-triaged casualties but also casualties not having
received primary medical treatment in the field. This
lack of pre-hospital care will necessitate a large con-
sumption of medical resources and strategic facilities to
surge capacity. This point must also be considered in
disaster planning.
Transportation
This study shows that the overall effort of transporting
victims was uncoordinated and insufficient. However, an
air bridge did provide a means of rapid transportation
for earthquake victims. Approximately 12,000 injured
people were evacuated within 48-72 hours using civil
and military aircrafts, road transportation and helicop-
ters [31,32].
These findings are supported by other studies [10].
Furthermore, insufficient capacity of evacuation by air
within the first 24 hours has been shown to lead to a
higher mortality rate [10]. Consequently, this leads to
patients being moved by non-standard methods [10].
Our observation that traffic jams inhibited transporta-
tion was confirmed by other researchers. Most of the
roads leading both to and from Bam were blocked due
to the rapid influx of rescue workers and by victims’
relatives coming from neighbouring cities [14,33].
The effects of earthquakes on transportation are simi-
lar worldwide. For instance, on the first day after the
Kobe earthquake in Japan in1995, only one person was
transported by helicopter, and a total of 17 people were
transported within the first 72 hours [1,34]. The family
car was the most frequent means of transportation, and
ambulances were used in only 26% of the transports
[35]. Other studies have also reported similar observa-
tions [27,30,36].
We conclude that ground transportation is always
affected in major earthquakes. In addition, air transpor-
tation services are often unavailable. The failure of
transportation of casualties could seriously affect the
medical response. Therefore, the receiving hospitals
could receive the casualties only after a long delay.
Thus, enabling these hospitals to prepare for incoming
casualties, and effectuate their disaster management
plan if it exists.
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Obstacles
Lack of disaster management plan
Timely and effective response to disasters requires an
organized disaster response system which can provide
the appropriate aid [10,37,38].
The lack of a disaster management plan was found to
be the main obstacle in the pre-hospital medical man-
agement, with respect to triage, treatment, and transpor-
tation. Preparedness was not a priority for the Ministry
of Health of Iran prior to the Bam earthquake, as
explained by de Ville [18]. The major problem was the
lack of coordination between the organizations responsi-
ble for disaster management, this in turn, is the conse-
quence of the lack of both local and regional disaster
management plans [12,14,26].
The lack of a disaster management plan has been
recognized as a challenge worldwide regarding disaster
response. The preparedness of the Ministry of Health in
Pakistan was far from sufficient regarding the earth-
quake in 2005 [18]. Since there was no disaster manage-
ment plan during the Gujarat earthquake, in India,
2001, most of the decision-making was completely ad
hoc [36]. The problem with coordination in the
response is also confirmed by Schwartz et al, as reported
from the Tsunami in 2004 [27].
Our results emphasized the necessity in developing a
comprehensive and integrated disaster management plan
for the medical system.
Absence of disaster medical assistance team
Another obstacle in the pre-hospital medical response
during the Bam earthquake was the absence of standar-
dized disaster medical assistance teams (DMATs).
DMATs defined as “mobile, trained medical teams that
can be rapidly deployed during the acute phase of a dis-
aster, provide medical treatment and relief activities,
assisting in transferring casualties from disaster-affected
areas to appropriate medical facilities” [34].
The absence of standardized DMATs effects triage,
treatment and transportation. Although, no previous
studies have clearly analyzed the role of DMATs in the
Bam earthquake, two studies point out that physicians
and responders had not received training for aid, rescue,
and treatment in critical conditions [12,14].
There was a similar situation during the earthquakes in
Taiwan (1999), and Japan (1995). Only a small number of
medical teams were able to provide critical care needed
during these earthquakes. These experiences actually lead
to the development of disaster medical assistance teams
and the recognition of their importance [30,34,39].
Taking all of this into account is of great importance
in establishing DMATs in Iran.
Lack of resources
The post-earthquake environment has normally very
limited medical resources in the face of overwhelming
needs [40]. The shortage of medical resources during
the early phase of the Bam earthquake was an important
obstacle for pre-hospital medical management. Our
study is one of few, which took the shortage of medical
resources in the early phase into consideration. There
was a noticeable shortage of beds, blankets, triage tags,
medicine and intravenous fluids, during the first days
after the earthquake [14,41].
Reports from other earthquakes show a similar situa-
tion worldwide. de Ville explained that in spite of an
overwhelming budget, after the tsunami in 2004, the
external responses were burdened by serious shortcom-
ings [18]. Kohl et al. discusses also, the shortage of
resources in the healthcare systems in the affected coun-
tries, before and during the Tsunami [42].
Limiting factors for the medical response during the
Pakistan earthquake were operating space, equipment,
supplies, and paramedical staff [28].
Based on these findings, it is essential to develop an
effective logistics system, and define its role as part of a
comprehensive disaster management plan in order to
provide the necessary medical resources in the earth-
quake area.
Facilitator
The military system
The current study illustrated the comprehensive role of
military teams, especially their participation in the air-
lifting of casualties and the provision of necessary
resources.
These results are supported by other studies
[14,18,26,32,33] demonstrating the role of the military
during the early phase of response. These among others;
established field hospitals, triage, albeit to a limited
extent, transporting medical and health care personnel
to the disaster area and playing a significant role in air
transportation of casualties to other receiving hospitals
[14,18,26,32,33].
Similar experiences are reported in other disasters, e.g.
the Tsunami in Thailand and Indonesia [27,43], the
Chi-Chi earthquake in Taiwan [16,39] and the Gujarat
earthquake in India [44].
As demonstrated, the army plays an important part in
the early response to earthquakes. The army can be
used in all parts of the medical response to an earth-
quake which should be taken into consideration when
developing a comprehensive disaster management plan.
Skilled medical volunteers
Medical volunteers that came to the earthquake area, as
part of a team or individually, during the early response
to the earthquake were another facilitator. The first
volunteer medical relief team consisted of 40 specialists,
and arrived in the area a few hours after the event.
These volunteers conducted the triage at the Bam
Djalali et al. Scandinavian Journal of Trauma, Resuscitation and Emergency Medicine 2011, 19:30
http://www.sjtrem.com/content/19/1/30
Page 7 of 9
airport [31]. Numerous teams consisting of physicians,
paramedics, and volunteers from Universities of Medical
Sciences from all over the country were dispatched to
the area [33].
Volunteers played a crucial role in mass-casualty
incidents [45]. Volunteer doctors from various back-
grounds teamed up to meet the medical crisis in the
Gujarat earthquake [36]. The rapid deployment of
medical personnel from unaffected areas and volun-
teers from abroad helped key personnel handle the
medical needs of the tsunami victims in Thailand [27].
This is also confirmed by Yasin et al. showing that
medical teams composed of volunteers from Pakistan
and abroad came in large numbers in response to the
Pakistan earthquake [28].
In spite of the long delay, the role of international
volunteer teams is important in helping the affected
community. International organizations can assist the
affected country by providing urgent medical services in
proximity to the disaster area, thereby compensating for
the shortages of medical facilities at national level [46].
The number of volunteers is virtually unlimited in
Iran, and medical volunteers are most willing to assist
[18]. Organizing the volunteers is not possible during
the response phase of a disaster. However, it could be
considered during the preparedness phase.
Conclusions
This study was based on interviews from the managers
at Iran’s emergency and disaster medicine system, who
were responsible for the initial response to the Bam
earthquake. We focused on the initial triage, treatment
and transportation. Skilled medical volunteers and the
military medical teams were facilitators of the early
phase of the medical response. The main obstacles to
the pre-hospital medical response were the lack of a dis-
aster management plan, the absence of disaster medical
assistance teams and the overall lack of resources. The
most compelling, and at the same time amenable obsta-
cle, was the lack of a disaster management plan. It is
evident that implementing a comprehensive plan would
not only save lives but decrease suffering and enable an
effective usage of the available resources. Due to the
crucial role of pre-hospital care system in disasters there
is a need for further investigation based on the result of
this study to develop strategies for improving the
system.
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